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Abstract—The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) defines 
the first specifications for cellular-based vehicle-to-everything (C-
V2X) communications in Release 14. C-V2X extends LTE's device-
to-device communication modes by adding two new modes of opera-
tion for vehicular systems in coverage and out of coverage of an LTE 
base station, or eNB. The vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication 
mode does not rely on the cellular infrastructure and the C-V2X de-
vices employ a distributed and sensing-based semi-persistent sched-
uling to schedule their packet transmissions. As a promising alterna-
tive to dedicated short range communications, the security aspects of 
C-V2X need to be carefully designed and evaluated to ensure the 
availability and integrity of the service and data. This paper dis-
cusses possible threat scenarios, reviews the 3GPP specifications and 
finds that, despite the safety-critical nature of C-V2X, only few mech-
anisms and procedures have be specified to secure the system. We 
discuss emerging technologies and provide research directions to im-
prove C-V2X system security and reliability and ensure their wide-
spread adoption in civilian and mission-critical communication con-
texts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) will support more ef-
ficient vehicular traffic flow, increased vehicular and pedestrian 
safety, and, eventually, autonomous driving. Wireless communi-
cations is fundamental for enabling ITS and recent advances in 
communications technology and systems enable establishing reli-
able wireless links and networks among cars, cars and pedestrians, 
and cars and fixed infrastructure. The success of ITS will be meas-
ured in terms of how well it can scale to the ever increasing mo-
bility scenarios and environmental conditions. This poses a strin-
gent need for ultra-reliable and ultra-low latency communications 
in dense environments, where thousands of cars can be simulta-
neously present in a given area, moving at different speeds and 
following different trajectories. 
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specified the 
long-term evolution (LTE) for providing mobile broadband ser-
vices in 2008. LTE has been considerably extended in scope since 
its first release, Release 8 (R8). 3GPP R12 specifies Proximity 
Services (ProSe) for Device-to-Device (D2D) communications. 
D2D enables exchange of data over short distances through a di-
rect link between user equipment (UEs). This offers an efficient 
way to bypass the LTE base station, or eNodeB (eNB), and thus 
offload the eNB traffic. Apart from content sharing, a D2D UE 
can act as a relay for another UE with a poor connection to the 
eNB to extend cellular network coverage. Two modes, Modes 1 
and 2, have been defined for in coverage and out of coverage op-
eration. In Mode 1, the eNBs perform the scheduling of UEs, and 
each UE needs to be within the serviceable area of an eNB. In 
Mode 2, distributed scheduling is carried out by the D2D UEs, 
which do not need to be in the coverage area of the LTE radio 
access network. One of the operational principle of Modes 1 and 
2 is battery life improvement of mobile devices. But, D2D is also 
an important mode for mission-critical networks since it allows 
creating ad-hoc networks where there is no cellular infrastructure 
or where the infrastructure is damaged. Next generation public 
safety networks will be LTE-based and make use of UEs with 
D2D communications capabilities. 
The constraints and requirements of vehicular communica-
tions are quite different than those of static or slowly moving D2D 
users. Specifically, the high latencies of ProSe are not suitable for 
vehicular communications, where packet delays or packet losses 
can have severe consequences. 3GPP R14 therefore extends the 
ProSe functionality by adding two new modes, Modes 3 and 4, for 
cellular vehicle-to-everything (C-V2X) connectivity. Mode 3 en-
compasses vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-network 
(V2N), whereas Mode 4 supports vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and 
vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) communications [1]. In other words, 
Mode 3 uses the radio access network, whereas Mode 4 enables 
UEs to directly talk to one another. These two C-V2X communi-
cations modes have been designed to satisfy the latency require-
ments and accommodate high Doppler spreads and high density 
of vehicles. They are the vehicular communications equivalents 
of D2D Modes 1 and 2. 
C-V2X has been introduced for safety and non-safety related 
applications. Safety applications include the dissemination of ac-
cidents and sudden breaks. Non-safety applications enable opera-
tional and resource efficiencies, among others, by providing rele-
vant information about road status, traffic lights, and so forth. 
Both types of applications require reliable and timely reception of 
messages that are confidential and integrity protected. Hence, se-
curity is another key requirement for C-V2X and constitutes a 
challenging research problem because of the stringent resource 
constraints as well as the dynamics of C-V2X systems and appli-
cations. C-V2X messages are short and are regularly broadcast 
from vehicular UEs whose recipients change. Hence, the tradi-
tional signaling and processing procedures to authenticate and au-
thorize transmitters and protect messages are not suitable in this 
context and alternative solutions need to be sought. 
This paper describes some potential threats to C-V2X commu-
nications, discusses the proposed security mechanisms in the 
standards, and derives recommendations and research directions. 
 Section II introduces the operational principles of C-V2X. Sec-
tions III and IV discuss the need for C-V2X security and privacy, 
the threats, and the requirements and procedures as standardized 
by 3GPP. Section V discusses alternative solutions and provides 
research directions. Section VI concludes the paper.  
The scope of this paper is limited to LTE-based V2X, or C-
V2X, and the analysis of the security requirements, protocol-spe-
cific procedures and research opportunities with focus on the 
communications layers. Non-protocol specific cyberattacks on 
vehicles or ITS systems [2] [3] are beyond the scope of this paper. 
It should be noted that other types of ITS communications stand-
ards exist [4] [5], dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) 
[6] being the most prominent. 
II. C-V2X RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES 
C-V2X uses the sidelink (SL) for sending and receiving mes-
sages between a vehicular UE and an eNB (Mode 3) or among 
vehicular UEs (Mode 4). The former uses the LTE-Uu interface, 
whereas the latter uses the new PC5 interface, the direct link be-
tween two vehicular UEs. The maximum allowed latency ranges 
between 20 and 100 ms, depending on the application. 
A. Resources 
Sidelink resources are shared with the LTE uplink (UL). C-
V2X allows channel bandwidths of 10 and 20 MHz. A channel is 
further divided into subchannels in the frequency domain and sub-
frames in the time domain. Each subchannel consists of several 
resource blocks (RBs). An RB is defined as 12 subcarriers by 1 
slot, or 180 kHz by 0.5 ms to be consistent with the LTE UL or 
downlink (DL) operation. The number of RBs per subchannel is 
configurable.  
Maintaining LTE’s transmission time interval (TTI) of 1 ms, 
the 1 ms subframe constitutes the time granularity of C-V2X mes-
sages and is the basis for message scheduling. As with LTE, RBs 
are thus scheduled in pairs. 
The vehicular UE data is carried over the Physical SL Shared 
Channel (PSSCH), which is transmitted along with the Physical 
SL Control Channel (PSCCH) that carries the SL control infor-
mation (SCI). Two resource configurations are possible: In the 
adjacent configuration (Fig. 1a), the control and data channels are 
transmitted in adjacent RBs, occupying one or several subchan-
nels. The SCI is transmitted in the first two RBs in the reserved 
subframe—four in total—followed by the data. In the nonadjacent 
configuration, two separate resource pools are configured for the 
PSCCH and PSSCH (Fig. 1b). 
B. Sidelink Control Information  
SCI Format 1 is introduced in 3GPP R14 for C-V2X, whereas 
SCI Format 0 remains from R12 for D2D. The SCI is transmitted 
over the PSCCH and carries the information related to the trans-
mission of data over the PSSCH. SCI Format 1 informs the re-
ceiving vehicular UEs about the resource reservation interval, the 
frequency location of initial transmission and retransmission, the 
time gap between initial transmission and retransmission, and the 
modulation and coding scheme of the PSSCH data. 
C. Physical Layer 
As for the LTE UL, the C-V2X channel access is singe-carrier 
frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA). The control in-
formation is QPSK modulated; QPSK or 16-QAM is used for the 
data. Only normal cyclic prefix is supported in C-V2X. The last 
SC-FDMA symbol in each subframe serves as a guard period. 
C-V2X increases the number of subframes carrying the De-
modulation Reference Signal (DMRS) to three per RB for the 
Physical SL Broadcast Channel (PSBCH) and to four for the 
PSCCH and PSSCH to account for the high Doppler spread at rel-
ative speeds of up to 500 km/h [7]. 
D. MAC Layer: Scheduling 
In Mode 3, the UEs communicate with the infrastructure or 
network via eNBs, using the LTE Uu interface. All the control and 
data signaling is between the C-V2X-enabled UE and the eNB, 
which also handles the scheduling and centrally controls the ac-
cess to the radio spectrum. In Mode 4, however, scheduling is de-
centralized and is within the responsibility of the vehicular UEs. 
More precisely, UEs continuously sense the spectrum and select 
resources for transmission, employing the semi-persistent sched-
uling (SPS) [8]. 
SPS was introduced in earlier LTE releases to support services 
that require deterministic latency, such as voice. Mode 4 uses it to 
determine suitable semi-persistent transmission opportunities, i.e. 
the set of physical subframes and subchannels for regular trans-
mission of messages over a certain time period.  
As illustrated in Fig. 2, vehicular UEs continuously sense the 
radio frequency (RF) spectrum and use the decoded data over one 
thousand past subframes to select a set of candidate single-sub-
frame resources within the selection window. A candidate single-
subframe resource, which is illustrated as the shaded block in the 
selection window of Fig. 2, consists of the RBs contained in a 
subframe and one or more contiguous subchannels. The number 
of required subchannels is a function of the message size.  
 
Fig. 1. Adjacent (a) and nonadjacent (b) PSCCH and PSSCH. 
 
Fig. 2. Sensing and selection windows for SPS in C-V2X. 
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 The SPS scheduling procedure is as follows: The UE initially 
considers all resources as candidate resources. A two-step exclu-
sion process first excludes those single-subframe resources that 
have not been monitored. The SPS algorithm then uses the sensing 
information to discard additional single-subframe resources 
where the reference signal received power (RSRP) is found to be 
above the established threshold. If more than 20% of the total re-
sources in the selection window remain, the MAC randomly se-
lects a candidate resource from the 20% of single-subframe can-
didate resources with the smallest average SL received signal 
strength indicator (S-RSSI). If fewer the 20% of candidate re-
sources remain in the pool, the threshold is increased by 3 dB and 
the two-step exclusion process is repeated. 
Resources are maintained for a certain number of message 
transmission intervals. This number is randomly selected in a 
range that depends on the message rate. Between 5 and 75 trans-
missions or multiples thereof can be scheduled by the UE with a 
single SPS invocation [9].  
The detailed SPS procedure is specified by 3GPP in [7] [9] 
and analyzed in [8]. 
III. C-V2X SECURITY AND POTENTIAL THREATS 
There are different communications security aspects that are 
desired for ITS. These can generally be classified as [2]: 
 Identification and authenticity of the user to enable author-
ized access to services or information as well as authorized 
provisioning of services or information, 
 Integrity of messages to ensure that information is accu-
rate and can be trusted,  
 Availability of the service or information, 
 Confidentiality and privacy of users, their data and actions 
from eavesdropping and exploitation, and 
 Non-repudiation and accountability of the source. 
In C-V2X, users broadcast messages and must be authorized to 
do so. The data and control signaling they broadcast need to be 
legitimate and accurate. Privacy is important to avoid tracking of 
users and exploits, among others. Table I outlines some of the C-
V2X security threats, which are discussed in continuation under 
the above categories. 
A. Identification, Authenticity, and Integrity 
The messages that C-V2X UEs exchange are related to infor-
mation about vehicle speeds, directions, and other actions, such 
as breaking or accelerating. Such information is encapsulated in 
basic safety messages (BSMs). BSMs, introduced by the Society 
of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in the US, support all safety re-
lated V2X applications. These messages are regularly broadcast, 
usually at a rate of 10 Hz. Event-triggered messages inform about 
sudden or unexpected events, such as accidents. The messages 
that are transmitted from one vehicle will thus affect the operation 
of other vehicles in the area. If a UE transmits false information, 
other UEs receiving it may trigger actions, which, instead of opti-
mizing the vehicular traffic flow on roads and highways, may gen-
erate chaos. For instance, if a UE warns of an accident that does 
not exist, the approaching vehicles may slow down creating con-
gestion. When this happens on recurring basis, the level of thrust 
will decrease and future messages may be ignored, defeating the 
purpose of C-V2X as a technology to increase traffic safety, re-
source efficiency, and system performance. It is therefore para-
mount that messages can be trusted. Since they are transmitted 
over the air and heard by many, source and message authenticity 
mechanisms need to be enforced. 
B. Availability 
Capacity is a key metric in wireless communications and C-
V2X. Different techniques exist to increase capacity, but irrespec-
tive of these, adding more users adds interference and stress to the 
network because of the physically limited and shared resources. If 
dummy users create service requests or participate in broadcasting 
dummy messages, the RF spectrum will become more congested 
and the C-V2X service less reliable, compromising the availability 
of information. 
As shown in other communications contexts, including LTE, 
radiating in RF bands where C-V2X services are provided, can 
make the proper decoding of messages challenging, if  not  impos-
sible. Mechanisms that allow recovering corrupted or lost mes-
sages, usually by means of strong coding and retransmission, add 
to the RF congestion, increase latency and power consumption, 
among others. 
C. Confidentiality and Privacy 
 The identifies, position, actions and trajectories of UEs need to 
be confidential to avoid tracking of vehicles. If messages from UEs 
are replayed at different times or at different locations, RF conges-
tion is the immediate effect, but also confusion if two messages 
from the same source are received with inconsistent information. 
Jamming the regular transmissions from a single vehicular UE is 
also possible, even without message decoding because of the struc-
tured SPS and message rates. In dynamic vehicular environments, 
confusion about a vehicle location, speed, etc. can be created 
through delayed message replay without modifying the message 
content. 
TABLE I – SOME ENVISIONED C-V2X SECURITY THREATS AND SCENARIOS. 
Threat Scenario Key 
Fake 
nodes 
Fake UEs, UE-road side units (RSUs), or eNB-RSUs can 
be deployed and this is a legitimate threat occurring to-
day with 4G LTE [11] [12]. Such nodes can compromise 
UE privacy or provide false control information or data. 
A. 
C. 
False in-
formation 
Rogue UEs can provide false information to deceive 
other UEs and trigger certain actions. 
A. 
Fake cer-
tificates 
Rogue UEs can send many fake authentication certifi-
cates to drain the computing resources of UEs trying to 
verify the sender [13]. 
A. 
B. 
RF con-
gestion 
Illegitimate UEs that transmit frequent messages will 
create more congestion in the spectrum, leading to more 
interference and lower system performance. 
B. 
Jamming Jammers create direct interference to transmitted signals 
to impede their proper demodulation. Different types of 
jammers exist and can cause system degradation at dif-
ferent levels [10].  
B. 
RF replay UEs that receive and decode messages from other UEs 
can replay them. This can cause congestion, (reactive) 
jamming, or confusion about inconsistent message con-
tent. One can imagine a network of distributed UEs that 
replay messages and cause congestion, confusion, or 
both in different areas. 
C. 
Malfunc-
tioning 
UE 
A UE listens to broadcasted messages as well as senses 
the RF environment to broadcast. If (1) time or frequency 
synchronization is not properly established, (2) RF sens-
ing is not reliable due to equipment failure, or (3) the SPS 
or congestion control mechanisms fails, significant inter-
ference can be caused because of the time and frequency 
sensitive nature of orthogonal frequency division multi-
ple access. 
D. 
 D. Non-Repudiation and Accountability 
 Malfunctioning UEs can significantly compromise SC-FDMA 
system performance. 3GPP establishes mechanisms when non-C-
V2X UEs are out of sync. For example, a UE is not allowed to 
transmit if it stops receiving the LTE time advancement commands 
from the eNB. Similar mechanisms are needed for C-V2X and 
need to be enforced. In C-V2X, UEs rely mostly on GPS as the 
synchronization source, but can use infrastructure nodes, where 
available, or other UEs. If no external source exists, depending on 
the type and quality of oscillators, frequency and timing drifts will 
occur that add up over time and can cause system malfunctioning 
and significant interference. Harmful nonsynchronous transmis-
sion needs to be identified and the corresponding UEs accounted 
for it. 
IV. 3GPP C-V2X SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES 
This section analyzes the 3GPP security requirements and pro-
cedures for C-V2X. 
A. Authentication Requirement 
3GPP states that “V2X network entities shall be able to 
authenticate the source of the received data communications, of 
data between V2X network entities shall be confidentiality and in-
tegrity protected and protected from replays” [14]. Only author-
ized entities should be able to transmit data and only messages 
whose data origin has been verified should be processed by the UE. 
Since it is not possible to prevent RF transmissions from unauthor-
ized users, including standard-compliant transmissions that would 
appear regular and legitimate, the recipients should be able to iden-
tify the sender and verify if it was authorized to transmit the data. 
 3GPP thus recognizes the fundamental need for user authenti-
cation, which is essential for trust. If the data comes from an unau-
thorized or unknown transmitter, it may contain unreliable infor-
mation and should be handled with caution. The specifications, 
however, only outlines the requirement, not the mechanisms and 
different manufacturers may feel different about the need for 
strong authentication and may have other business priorities.  
 Traditional LTE authentication mechanisms can be employed 
and enforced in Mode 3. But, an operator may not be present in 
Mode 4 and proper authentication has to rely on the chip manufac-
turers and exhaustive testing. Standardization is important for in-
teroperability and for setting appropriate authentication standards 
for all participating UEs as one weak vehicular UE may compro-
mise the security of the entire system. 
B. Privacy Requirement 
 3GPP states that UE identity should not be long-term trackable 
or identifiable from its transmissions over the PC5 interface. Alt-
hough UE authenticity needs to be verifiable, as discussed above, 
this should be used only for the purpose of verifying the legitimacy 
of the sender (and the message). This requirement applies to UEs 
and non-V2X entities and extends to operators and third parties. 
 In order to achieve the above, the permanent identities of UEs 
need to be properly protected and their exposure minimized using 
pseudonymity. Fake eNBs can force legitimate UEs to share their 
international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) and location infor-
mation [11] and equivalent attacks could affect vehicular UEs. 
 3GPP also requires protection from eavesdropping of the ap-
plication layer UE identity, which is transmitted as part of the V2X 
message. 
Whereas these requirements are appropriate, it is less clear 
how to effectively achieve this in an ad-hoc network (C-V2X 
Mode 4), as opposed to the infrastructure-supported solution 
(Mode 3). More precisely, 3GPP does not impose any privacy 
mechanisms for the PC5 SL and leaves this to the regional regu-
lators and operators. It suggests changing and randomizing the 
source layer 2 ID and source IP address in coordination with the 
application layer ID changes. There is no additional protection for 
the Uu SL beside what LTE provides. 
C. Maintenance Requirement  
Over-the-air (OTA) mechanisms shall be used to secure the 
transfer of the configuration data and maintain up-to-date security 
mechanisms. This data will typically be stored in the universal in-
tegrated circuit card (UICC). 
Whereas security-related updates are critical, OTA updates 
need special handling. The challenge here is having regular access 
to trusted sources, especially when roaming or when typically not 
depending on a central operator (Mode 4). Another challenge is 
maintaining interoperability among vehicular UEs from different 
vendors/operators using the highest security standards. 
D. Security Procedures  
The LTE security measures should be used for the LTE-Uu 
interface, that is, the interface between the UE and the eNB (Mode 
3). The network provider decides whether to use ciphering or not. 
The 3GPP R14 specifications for C-V2X [14] explicitly state that 
no security is applied for the PC5 one-to-many communication by 
setting the fields related to group security to 0. This means that 
the basic safety and event-triggered messages that are exchanged 
among UEs have no standard security mechanisms in place. 
Application layer security is outside the scope of 3GPP, but it 
is suggested that periodically refreshed credentials be used to 
avoid UE tracking, among others. 
Release 15 [15] describes the architectural enhancements for 
V2X services and provides more details about authorization over 
both reference points, PC5 and LTE-Uu. While this is indispensa-
ble, this alone cannot resolve the concerns identified in Table I, 
such as how to deal with excessive RF congestion. 
V. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 C-V2X Mode 4 is an ad-hoc communication mode using the 
PC5 air interface between UEs. In this mode, the peers are not 
known a priory and change dynamically because of the different 
trajectories of vehicles. Since infrastructure is not involved in this 
mode, standard LTE security mechanisms cannot be applied. 
3GPP does not address the establishment of ad-hoc security asso-
ciations in R14. 
 Research is needed to identify the key vulnerabilities of a new 
communications system and propose and demonstrate mecha-
nisms to harden it. Research in the following areas can be lever-
aged to increase the security of C-V2X: 
 Physical layer techniques: Use and leverage the diver-
sity of the channel as well as interference mitigation tech-
niques [16]. Embed signatures or other unique identifiers 
in messages to identify legitimate UEs and legitimate 
messages. 
 Cross-layer techniques: Revise scheduling, congestion 
control and other C-V2X procedures to make them more 
robust and aware of potential threats. For example, sched-
ule messages for the purpose of enhancing distributed se-
curity awareness. 
  Edge and Cloud computing: Use the processing power 
of the Cloud to assist in determining fake transmitters and 
leverage edge computing resources to reduce latency and 
network congestion [17]. 
 Network-aided procedures: Have the network periodi-
cally notify UEs of legitimate UEs in the area using C-
V2X or parallel communications protocols, such as regu-
lar LTE. 
 Radio environment map (REM): Have UEs built their 
REMs, where processed RF spectrum activity and the in-
formation exchanged among UEs is stored and contrasted 
to identify anomalies. 
 Spectrum access system (SAS): The vehicular UEs and 
roadside units can regularly provide sensing information 
to a central SAS for RF anomaly detection. 
 Machine learning (ML): ML can be effectively em-
ployed to analyze huge amounts of data and classify it. 
When either the normal behavior is known or the attacks, 
or both, ML tools can be trained to distinguish between 
normal and abnormal activity. 
 Multiple sensor information processing: Use infor-
mation from multiple sensors (cameras, radar, lidar, etc.) 
to validate C-V2X messages, weigh decisions and dy-
namically update node and information thrust metrics. 
Check message content for consistency using physical at-
tributes, past messages, environmental information, etc. 
 One of the main challenges is the real-time nature of the data 
and the limited resources (time, RF bandwidth, and processing 
power) that are available. Moreover, the interference or attack may 
change. Therefore, one solution will not fit all cases and a single 
approach may result ineffective. Instead, several techniques should 
be combined and used in concert. For example, the system could 
do some local processing and combine it with data processed at the 
Edge or Cloud and data provided by the network. Research has 
shown that combining multiple sources of data can help identifying 
and overcoming a threat. An example of this is jointly processing 
several of the widely used performance measurement counters and 
key performance indicators in cellular networks to identify a spe-
cific source of interference [18].  
 The following tools can be leveraged for accelerating research, 
testing, and standardization: 
 Software-defined radios and open-source software, 
 Laboratory and field experiments, providing data for re-
searchers to use for evaluating new approaches for secure 
C-V2X systems, 
 Crowdsourcing, allowing distributed development and 
testing as well as contributions to specifications, 
 Specifications with more dynamic contributions, 
 Regular firmware and software updates and secure soft-
ware downloads and installations at a rate comparable to 
software updates of operating systems,  
 Use of virtualization technology to enable dynamic net-
work reconfiguration and security as a service.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper presents the C-V2X communications protocol and 
analyzes some of its security features and requirements. 3GPP has 
outlined the security mechanisms, but leaves it in the hands of the 
developers to implement the proper features. It states: “All V2X 
services do not have the same security requirements and hence 
may not require the use of all the described features. It is up to the 
deployment of the feature to ensure that all the appropriate 
security aspects are addressed.”  
 When compared to D2D, it is more challenging to establish se-
curity in C-V2X as it requires very low latency and high reliability 
in a highly dynamic environment. C-V2X, on the other hand, will 
typically be less energy and computing resource limited, which 
means it can collect, store and process more data than handheld 
D2D UEs. 
 Ongoing standardization efforts are key for the establishment 
of reliable communications systems. Security mechanisms need to 
be incorporated into the C-V2X framework and need to be enforce-
able. This adds overhead to the resource constrained service and 
this overhead needs to be accounted for. However, when security 
is compromised, the system overhead for fixing the issue can be-
come orders of magnitude worse and the immediate and long-term 
consequences significant. It takes time to revise a standard and re-
design a system. If security features are not properly standardized 
and enabled by design, security patches may not be compatible 
across platforms and not effective if not implemented by all. 
 Being a cellular technology based on 4G LTE provides a good 
foundation because it inherits its security mechanisms and can lev-
erage the abundant and ongoing research in this field. However, 
4G LTE has its known vulnerabilities and more research is needed 
if C-V2X is to become a widely deployed and widely relied on ITS 
technology. 3GPP R15 introduces 5G New Radio, which will add 
more security features to make next generation C-V2X more se-
cure. The 5G security architecture and procedures, as specified in 
[19][20], do not address V2X or D2D out-of-coverage mode of op-
eration yet. Important changes are expected in future revisions, but 
need continuous research support. 
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